LogBlog

Quick and Fun Poll on Behavior Change

While I am analyzing my previous poll, here is a quick and fun one: do we change our behavior when monitored? Vote away!

 

Technorati tags: , , ,

Posted by Anton Chuvakin on March 27, 2008 in Compliance , Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters , Security | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Top 11 Reasons to Analyze Your Logs

As promised, here is another "Top 11 Reasons" which is about log analysis. Don't just read your logs (definitely don't just collect them); analyze them. Why? Here are the reasons:

  1. Seen an obscure log message lately? Me too - in fact, everybody have. How do you know what it means (and logs usually do mean something) without analysis? At the very least, you might need to bring additional context to know what some logs mean (example: IP address -> hostname -> server owner)
  2. Logs often measure in gigabytes and soon will in terabytes; log volume grows all the time - it definitely passed the  limit of what a human can read a long time ago, it then made simple filtering 'what logs to read' impossible as well: automated log analysis is the only choice.
  3. Do you peruse your logs in real time? This is simply absurd! However, automated real-time analysis is entirely possible (and some logs do crave for your attention ASAP - e.g. major system failures, confirmed intrusions, etc)
  4. Can you read multiple logs at the same time? Yes, kind of, if you print them out on multiple pages to correlate (yes, I've seen this done :-)). Is this efficient? God, no! Correlation across logs of different types is one of the most useful approaches to log analysis.
  5. A lot of insight hides in "sparse" logs, logs where a single record barely matters, but a large aggregate does (e.g. from one "connection allowed" firewall log to a scan pattern). Thus, the only way to extract that insight from a pool of data is through  algorithms that "condense" that collection of logs into usable knowledge (some say, visualization is the way to go)
  6. Ever did a manual log baselining? This is where you read the logs for a while and learn which ones are normal for your environment. Wonna do it again? Thought so :-)  Log baseline learning is a useful and simple log analysis technique, but humans can only do it for so much before burning out.
  7. OK, let's pick the important logs to review. Which ones are those? The right answer is "we don't know, until we see them." Thus, to even figure out which logs to read, you need automated analysis.
  8. Log analysis for compliance? Why, yes! Compliance is NOT only about log storage (e.g. see PCI DSS). How to highlight compliance-relevant messages? How to see which messages will lead to a violation? How do you satisfy those "daily log review" requirements (again, see PCI DSS)? Through automated analysis, of course!
  9. Logs  allow you to profile your users, your data and your resources/assets. Really? Yes, really: such profiling can then tell you if those users behave in an unusual manner (in fact, the oldest log analysis systems worked like that). Such techniques may help reach the holy grail of log analysis: have the system automatically tell you what matters for you!
  10. Ever tried to hire a log analysis expert? Those are few and far between. What if your junior analysts can suddenly analyze logs just as well? One log analysis system creator told me that his log data mining system enabled exactly that. Thus, saving a lot of money to his organization.
  11. Finally, can you predict future with your logs? I hope so! Research on predictive analytics is ongoing, but you can only do it with automated analysis tools, not with just your head alone (no matter how big :-)) ...

 Past top 11 reasons:

 

Technorati tags: , ,

Posted by Anton Chuvakin on February 22, 2008 in Innovation , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

Poll: What logs do you actually LOOK at?

This is my 6th logging poll (vote here now!)- links to the previous five polls below.

This one is deceptively similar to the #1 below, but it is not. This poll is What logs do you actually LOOK at? and not Which Logs Do You Collect? In other words, are you a log packrat? Are you collecting and never using the log data? You are making a mistake, if you don't.

Past polls:

  • Poll #5 "What are your top challenges with logs?" (analysis)
  • Poll #4 "Who looks at logs in your organization?" (analysis)
  • Poll #3 "What do you do with Logs?" (analysis)
  • Poll #2 "Why collect logs?" (analysis)
  • Poll #1 "Which logs do you collect?" (analysis)
  •  

    Technorati tags: , , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on February 14, 2008 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Logging Poll #5 "Top Logging Challenges" Analysis

    OK, this poll was insightful! The raw results are here and below:

    logpollchallengesresults_thumb

    What can we learn from this?

    First, what are the top challenges? It is with great regret :-) that I report that the #1 challenge is exactly the one I thought it would be: We collect logs but don't have time/resources to look at them. Yes, automated "analysis challenge" has only become more of a challenge as people deploy more tools that enable log collection on a massive scale (e.g. 75,000 logs/second). I dare to predict that we will finally have to tackle this one in the next year or two. In fact, this challenge rears it ugly head via another popular response, Lack of log analysis tools, which made Top 5 responses as well.

    Second, even though I didn't make any predictions about the #2 entry, but I was surprised: No way to effectively search all logs is a  very close #2 (obviously, 1 vote is not statistically significant here). Indeed, log searching is an elusive little problem, especially when we want to do it fast and on a large pool of logs. Even though I think we need to search less and discover more, the need to search logs will be with us forever (and, no, I don't think you need a special product just to do that ...)

    Third, I am happy to report that this poll indicates that we finally broke the back of "the beast" of  not having logs. Responses that point at not having logs (e.g. Logging is not enabled, We don't know what logging we must enable,  etc) are not terribly popular (then again, maybe it is due to self-selection of the blog readers ...)

    Fourth, infrastructure! Specifically, No infrastructure to manage the log volume we have is very popular as well (#4). This proves the point that I used to not take very seriously in the past (by mistake): when megabytes become gigabytes and those grow into terabytes, many things that used to trivial (e.g. moving logs from A to B, saving logs to disk, etc) become grand engineering challenges... Indeed, to manage high volume of logs you need a scalable log management solution (example)

    Sixth, as I lamented, few care about log security (this counts as laments, I guess).  Secure storage of logs is only bothering a few people. One word: yet! As of today, stored log hashing + (sometimes!) log transport encryption + (rarely!) encrypted archives are the state of the art.

    Next poll is coming up!

    Technorati tags: , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on February 08, 2008 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    NERC CIP Rules Out - Logs In!

    NERC security rules [PDF], that were updated and became mandatory last week, might well become "a new PCI DSS" and trigger "a golden age" of security in the energy industry: the rules are mandatory, they are specific (more specific than a lot of other regulatory security guidance) and there is an enforcement body (NERC) that can make life miserable for those not complying. 

    Here are some log-related examples from the guidance:

    "R5.1.2. The Responsible Entity shall establish methods, processes, and procedures that generate logs of sufficient detail to create historical audit trails of individual user account access activity for a minimum of ninety days. "

    "R6.4. The Responsible Entity shall retain all logs specified in Requirement R6 for ninety calendar days."


    "R6.5. The Responsible Entity shall review logs of system events related to cyber security
    and maintain records documenting review of logs. "

    So, again: have logs, retain them ("Top 11 Reasons to Collect and Preserve Computer Logs") and review them ("Top 11 Reasons to Look at Your Logs"). Or, better, have a log management tool do it for you!

     

    Technorati tags: , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on January 24, 2008 in Compliance , Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Poll: Who looks at logs at your organization?

    Here is my next poll about logs: Who looks at logs at your organization? Vote here! Also, my past polls and analysis are here.

    Past polls were:

  • Poll#3 "What Do You Do With Logs?" (analysis)
  • Poll#2 "Why Collect Logs?" (vote here, results so far, my analysis)
  • Poll #1 "Which Logs Do You Collect?" (vote here, raw results here, analysis here)
  • Posted by Anton Chuvakin on December 19, 2007 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    On Approaches to Database Monitoring

    So, people sometimes ask me about how to do database logging/auditing/monitoring and log analysis right. The key choice many seem to struggle with for database auditing and monitoring is reviewing database logs vs sniffing SQL traffic off the wire.  Before proceeding, please look for more background on database log management, auditing and monitoring in my database log management papers (longer, more detailed - shorter)  The table below summarizes the situation with database monitoring and auditing - now you can make your choice more intelligently (items in bold are the ones I consider key):

     

      Pro Con
    Sniff SQL traffic from the wire
    • No database performance impact
    • Awareness of returned content (for SELECTs)
    • Guaranteed role separation
    • Better for DBA monitoring
    • No agents
    • No database configuration changes
    • Extra device needs to be purchased, deployed and managed
    • Doesn't work with encryption
    • No local access monitoring
    Collect and analyze database logs
    • No extra $$$ - use your existing logging tool
    • Can user review activity across log sources, from databases to servers
    • Satisfies compliance demand for "database log review"
    • Can monitor ALL access to data in the database, even over APIs and local
    • Performance impact possible (*)
    • Database config changes needed
    • Usually not truly "real-time" (polling)

    Choose logs if you care for the relevant Pros (esp key ones) associated with them; choose sniffing if you care for the Pros and are NOT undermined by their Cons (e.g. difficulties of supporting encrypted traffic)

    Of course, one can also opt for a combined approach which follows the ideas of "double the benefits - for double the cost"...

    (*) Nobody really knows what it will be in each particular situation: 0-40% were observed under various conditions by various people ...

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on December 17, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Again, On Criticality of Logs

    I just wanted to highlight two pieces that, again, speak - or, better, scream! - about the importance of logs. I suspect that LogBlog readers don't need additional motivation to take logs seriously, but these are just too useful to skip.

    First is the interview with some convicted criminal hacker, who said that '... it would have been easy for IT and security managers to detect him in their companies' systems ... if they'd been looking. The problem was that, generally, no one was paying attention.

    "If they were just monitoring their boxes and keeping logs, they could easily have seen us logged in there," he said, adding that IT could have run its own scans, checking to see logged-in users."'

    Amen to that! Indeed, many of the successful-and-then-undetected attacks are due to incompetence. Why? 'Cause lacking logs or ignoring logs is indeed negligent and incompetent!

    Second, is my comment on the TJX case, which kinda follows the same idea: 'Dr. Anton Chuvakin, a security expert with LogLogic, said TJX [probably] didn't have decent logs. "What took TJX months was looking at all their systems and determining who took what data, from where, where it was sent, etc. The investigation took them months. They likely didn't have any logs, because they had to do system forensics rather than log analysis to arrive at their conclusions about who stole the data and how. If they had collected and analyzed log data centrally, the investigation would have been a piece of cake," he said in an e-mailed comment to InternetNews.com.'

    Indeed, doing disk forensics to know who did what is much more painful than checking reliable logs. Save yourself by logging, then saving and reviewing the logs!

    So, one more time (not the last, mind you!):

    Technorati tags: , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on December 11, 2007 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogLogic News , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Logging Poll #3 "What Do You Do With Logs?" Analysis

    So, the results of my 3rd poll are ready: live results are here, picture is also in this post.

    poll3whatdone_thumb

    First, this poll way more popular than my previous "why" poll. It seems like people do dislike to wonder "why."

    Second, what are  the two choices, that are by far the most popular? They are:

    Yes, this is the "state of the art" of logging:   collection of raw logs and "as needed" grep aka "slow and painful" search. In fact, the above answers might not even be given by the same people: some might be grepping logs on the individual servers, while others collect them on syslog servers and never touch them. That is why being in log management business is such a great thing: you have nearly the whole world to evangelize about the value of logs and log management tools.

    Third, what's the next most popular idea of analyzing logs? It is "Run my own log analysis tool" at 10% of the respondents. Indeed, this movement still lives and thrives: people choose the Build->Suffer approach to log management often enough ...

    Fourth, next come my somewhat self-inflicted surprise: apart from commercial log management (at 4%) and rolling one's own (discussed above at 10%), I added the option of "Use other log analysis tools"   which captured 7% of the vote. But what does that mean? I have no idea!

    Fifth, I am NOT surprised by the lack of popularity of the rule-based correlation tools, such as SIEM (at 2%). When I made my decision to join LogLogic, I had to ponder this one really, really hard. My conclusion at the time (which is also valid now, even more than back in 2006) was that "SIEM is for some, log management is for everybody." This poll confirms this further.

    Finally, all my logging polls and analysis are here. Next one is coming up!

    Technorati tags: , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on December 08, 2007 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Imagining an Ideal Log Management Tool?

    The idea came from Jeremiah Grossman (here) when he described "The Best Web Application Vulnerability Scanner in the World" thus: "Within a few moments of pressing the scan button it’ll find every vulnerability, with zero false positives, generate a pretty looking report, and voila you’re compliant with GLBA, HIPAA, and PCI-DSS. Of course, we all know such a web application scanner is simply not possible to create for a variety of reasons."

    So, let's imagine the ideal log management application.

    1. Logging configuration: the ideal log app will go and find all possible log sources (systems, devices, applications, etc) and then enable the right kind of logging on them according to a high level policy given to it
    2. Log collection: it will collect all the above logs securely (and without using any risky super-user access ) and with little to no impact to networks and systems
    3. Log storage: it can security store the above logs in the original format for as long as needed and in a manner allowing quick access to them - in both raw and summarized/enriched form
    4. Log analysis: this ideal application will be able to look at all kinds of logs, known to it and previously unseen, from standard and custom log sources, and tell the user what they need to know about their environment and based on their needs: what is broken? what is hacked? where? what is in violation of regulations/policies? what will break soon? who is doing this stuff? The analysis will power all of the following: automated actions, real-time notifications, long-term historical analysis as well as compliance relevance analysis
    5. Information presentation: this tool will distill the above data, information and conclusions generated by the analytic components and present then in a manner consistent with the user's role: from operator to analyst to engineer to executive. Interactive visual and drillable text-based data presentation across all log sources. The users can also customize the data presentation based on their wishes and job needs, as well as information perception styles
    6. Automation: the ideal log management tool will be able to take limited automated actions to resolve discovered and confirmed issues as well as generate guidance to users so that they know what actions to take, when full-auto mode is not appropriate. The responses will range from full-auto actions to assisted actions ('click here to fix it') to issuing detailed remediation guidance. The output will include a TODO-list of discovered items complete with actions suggested, ordered by priority
    7. Compliance: this tool can also be used directly by auditors to validate or prove compliance with relevant regulations by using regulation-specific content and all the collected data. The tool will also point at gaps in data collection as it applies to specific regulations that the user is interested in complying

    In other words, this magic black box will have raw log data shoveled from one side and will have answers to key questions that concern the IT users and their managers on the other side.

    Am I nuts? Well, can I dream for a second? :-)

    Technorati tags: , , , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on November 06, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Top 11 Reasons to Secure and Protect Your Logs

    Following my now-famous Top 11 Reasons to Collect and Preserve Computer Logs and Top 11 Reasons to Look at Your Logs, here is the promised "Top 11 Reasons to Secure and Protect Your Logs"

    1. Let's review why you are reviewing logs. Will logs that might have been changed by somebody, somewhere, somehow still be useful for items 1-11 from here? No? Secure them!
    2. Logs in court? Challenges abound! To respond to them, one needs to protect the logs so you can claim that they are both authentic and reliable.
    3. A human error still beats an evil hacker as the main cause of IT problems. Are your logs safe from it? Available when needed? Protect them from crashes and other faults!
    4. PCI DSS just says so: "Secure audit trails so they cannot be altered." Want to do it- or pay the fines?
    5. Do you protect financial records? Identity info? Passwords? Some of it ends up in logs (even if by mistake) - thus making them sensitive, protected information. Secure the C-I-A of logs!
    6. Do you look at logs during incident investigation? Do you want them to be "true" or full of random (if creative...) "stuff", inserted by the guilty party? Secure the logs!
    7. Think that "attacks vs logging" are theoretical? Think again. Are your logs safe or vulnerable? Is your logging tool 0wned?
    8. Syslog + UDP = log injection + log loss. Are you protected (reliable TCP, confirmed delivery, encryption - SSH, SSL, VPN)?
    9. Why modify logs? No, really, why change logs? If you never change logs - and you never should, unless it is appending to them - hash them right away after collection to make them immutable.
    10. Logs are backed up on tape - who will see them? Well, whoever restores the tape, that's who! Encrypt them to protect them from accidental and malicious disclosure if tape is lost.
    11. Why log access to logs? Same reason why you had the logs in the first place - to review who did what. Who broke through and stole the logs? Who browsed them without permission? Only logs will tell - if you have them!

    Overall, one need to strive for having no holes in log safeguards from log birth to analyst conclusion based on log information...

    Possibly related posts:

    Technorati tags: , , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on November 02, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Just What is Enterprise Class? Part V

    Here is the final enlightening post from Dimitri McKay, our super-brilliant network and systems engineer from the East Coast, where he continues to discuss the meaning of the phrase "enterprise-class," which is certainly MUCH more than a marketing buzzword! Part I is herePart II is herePart III is herePart IV is here.

    Dimitri McKay says: "This is the final piece in the five part series entitled “Enterprise Class”. The term “Enterprise Class” for most of us has appeared on Bullshit-Bingo cards for years, but when we actually explore WHAT “Enterprise Class” is and how it pertains to a certain product, you can learn quite a bit about that product, and how it stands up to both the competition and how it stacks up against what it is and what it should be.

    As of this writing, LogLogic has set free it’s next code-base, LogLogic4 Release 2. With added features and fixes, LogLogic fits the Enterprise all the more with each release.

    13. Usability: Because of the large number of customers using LogLogic, the mission critical nature of the business problems being addressed, and the system complexity that is introduced due to the previous topics, usability is a critical factor for LogLogic. Our goal is to strike an appropriate balance between ease of use and complex functionality. Let’s face it. Using LogLogic to handle forensics, or compliance, or general reporting and alerting is an easy solution to a very complex problem. We are taking the chaos of a massive amount of log-traffic and we are taming it via the use of log forensics tools, summary reports, and real-time alerts.

    When I was on the support team one of the biggest questions customers would call and ask after purchasing the LogLogic appliance was “Now what? What should I be looking for?” - and the answer LogLogic came up with was the compliance suites. The compliance suites are a phenomenal way of helping the customer hit the ground running. It’s simple. “Install this suite of search filters, alerts and custom reports. Then tailor it to your network. Now you’ve solved your compliance problems and/or government mandates.”

    14. Compatibility/Maintainability: To minimize downtime as part of providing high availability, LogLogic must provide compatibility from one release to the next. Backward compatibility means that the when a new version of LogLogic  is installed, it continues to work with the previously installed customizations and other systems witch which it interacts such as source devices and remote authentication services.

     Forward compatibility means that when systems around the LogLogic are upgraded, the LogLogic must continue to function as it did before, even though the new software may support new log formats. When fixes are provided for LogLogic, downtime for installing the fix must be minimized by providing support for incremented updates such as patches and hot-fixes. LogLogic must also offer several solutions to handle updates such as automatic update via the web, or manual file updates due to the appliances being offline.

    Thank you for reading my five piece foray into the Enterprise. Please feel free to email me your thoughts, comments, or post them below. Stay tuned to LogLogic as we journey where no other LMI vendor has gone before."

    Technorati tags: , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on October 31, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Poll: Why Do You Collect Logs?

    The previous poll (vote here, live results here, analysis here) proved to be a success so the next one is here.

    This time the question is: "Assuming that you centrally COLLECT system, network or security logs from their originating sources, what is THE MAIN reason for doing it?"


    Vote on!

    UPDATE 11/11/2007: results and analysis are posted here

    Technorati tags: , , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on October 31, 2007 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Log Collection Poll Results

    My poll on log collection have been a great success and now the results are in. Here is the link to the running totals as of now (the graphic snapshot from yesterday can be seen here). Let's review and discuss the findings after running it for slightly over a week.

    Next poll coming soon! Thanks a lot for responding!

    Possibly related posts:

     

    Technorati tags: , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on October 26, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Simple Log-based User Profiling for Activity Monitoring

    Recently I've been looking into detecting stolen/shared access account credentials. Now, how can you detect that? No NIDS will trigger, NIPS will let is pass, no unusual types of log records might ever by  produced (especially if only limited logging is enabled). And what raises the stakes is that this type of activity is not  only about "hacked" accounts, but also about insider abuse of accounts.

    However, there will likely be changes in how normal log records are produced.

    Let's summarize some known methods for using a simple user "profile" to detect account theft aka account sharing aka user impersonation aka access with stolen/shared credentials. It implies that we've been collecting the logs before the incident and have a solid trail of normal users and legitimate account owners.

    1. Unusual login source IP (e.g. normal user always comes from 10.0.X.Y or 10.1.X.Y, but now we see a login from 172.16.0.Z) - will work in some cases, but not for the free-for-all servers such as at a University
    2. Unusual login time (e.g. normal user always comes from 9AM to 5PM, now we see 3AM) - will work in most cases, but will fail if the attacker happens to be in the same time zone
    3. Unusual login session length  (e.g. normal user always stays logged in for 5-20 minutes, now we see a 10 hour-long session) - works only if logout is logged; might not catch a lot of realistic but malicious connections
    4. Unusual login frequency (e.g. legitimate user logs in once a day in the morning, now we see dozens of connections) - will work for some cases, but others will be missed
    5. Unusual login failure/success ratio before a successful login (e.g. normal user always types the password right the first time, now we see failures than successes) - not too reliable, obviously
    6. Unusual list of user actions performed (normal user only reads these files, but now we see writes to a very different set of files) - will work most frequently, but needs more granular logging of file access, object changes, etc (audit logging) [more on this in the near future!]

    So, if you have logs of user activities, at the very least, logins and logouts ( but having records of more user activities is always better!),  for the last few weeks or months, one can compute the above profiles using historical data and then compare them with current numbers (very similar to some of the methods from my classic log mining presentation).

    The final missing bit is for how long to collect your normal user behaviors: I discovered that 1 week to 1 month works pretty well. Less time yields unstable results and more time necessitates much more data crunching without much gain.

    Technorati tags: ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on October 12, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters , Security | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Just What is Enterprise Class? Part IV

    Here is the next enlightening post from Dimitri McKay, our super-brilliant network and systems engineer from the East Coast, where he continues to discuss the meaning of the phrase "enterprise-class," which is certainly MUCH more than a marketing buzzword! Part I is herePart II is herePart III is here

    "10. Serviceability/Manageability: The scale of deployment of a LogLogic solution, whether it be managed remotely or locally, requires features which allow the solution to be managed effectively. FCAPS is an acronym which is often used to remember the following guidelines of  security log appliance management:

    Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, and Security

    The users of LogLogic must be able to monitor what is happening on the system itself, as well as the network around it and applications on it, and to have the ability to diagnose faults when they occur.

    Fault diagnosis requires the ability to collect sufficient information about the fault when it occurs, preferably without having to reproduce the fault. We log our own appliance, and anything else on the network, and then alerts can be handled via SNMP traps sent to an SNMP trap receiver such as HP Open View or IBM Tivoli. The other option is an alert sent to a remote pager or mobile device, or even an email to the NOC/SOC personnel.

    11.  Customizability/Flexibility/Integrability: LogLogic is used to solve complex business problems on a large scale. For some it’s used for various compliance needs, such as PCI or SOX. To others, it’s an alerting or filtering tool, while forwarding a few of the log records on to a SEIM (typically, as much as it can handle, which is usually not as much as needed ...) or a specific other security tool. To others, LogLogic is used for general reporting, incident investigations or forensics. Regardless of how it’s used, LogLogic a different tool to different people.

    LogLogic appliances are rarely rolled out as a single unit in an environment. Generally they are rolled out by location, by message per second (MPS) requirements... or by long term storage requirements, but any way you shake it, LogLogic architecture is designed to meet the needs of the Enterprise (and this is not to say that SMBs won't benefit from log management!).

    Usually you’ll see several LX reporting/alerting appliances feeding back to a single long term storage ST appliance, but that’s not written in stone. Sometimes customers send all of their log data direct to the ST storage appliance (which handles a massive 75,000 messages per second) in order to take advantage of a single IP address destination. This, in my own humble opinion, is a good data center solution.

    My point is, the architecture of the LogLogic appliances is a variable (but still easy!) which gives you total control. There is no firm “config” that is required for boxes to be placed in. Instead, the architecture is flexible, and allows for multiple configurations depending on the environment they reside in. This is the ability to remain agile.

    Living in an enterprise world, we must adopt to new technologies as they become standards. Often some of the features on the LogLogic appliances overlap with other technologies already in use. Because of that, we have engaged the ability to utilize those technologies in those situations. One example is that LogLogic has but doesn’t always provide its own identity management functions. Typically there is another authentication management that the enterprise is already using, such as TACACS+ or RADIUS. The enterprise may have adopted particular standards to manage user databases and access control. For this LogLogic needs to be flexible in it’s architecture, allow customizability within the enterprise, and integrate well within the framework of the already existing environment.           

    12. Support: With any mission critical software deployment, the enterprise must have a reliable way of getting support for diagnosing problems and getting fixes and advanced replacements. This includes 24x7 availability for support personnel and an organization with the experience and expertise to understand how the appliances are used in enterprises. Our support is not only top-notch, but is also praised by our customers!

    Thank you for tuning in to part lV of “Enterprise Class” where I’ve laid down WHAT enterprise-class really is, and how LogLogic has tackled it. I’d also like to thank our competitors who have been visiting my blog. You can imitate, but you’ll never duplicate us, boys!

    Next piece will conclude the series ... stand by!"

    Technorati tags: ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on October 11, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    PoS Logs out of PCI Scope? Surely You Are Joking...

    ... well, turns out they were dead serious. As I expressed my puzzlement to our resident PCI auditor, he explained that PoS logs and overall security of PoS devices are often "in-scope for PCI, but out of scope for a typical PCI audit."  How bizarre is that?  But let's start from the beginning.

    First, what on Earth is a PoS? PoS, or Point-of-Sale terminal, is a machine that stores (or whoever else who takes credit cards) use to process credit card transactions: scan cards, communicate with verification server, print receipts, etc. It might be standalone or combined with a cash register. It might very very simple - just card reader + transaction unit in a single hardware unit - or as complex as a Windows PC with a cash drawer and no software updates (a scary thing indeed!)

    So, in the latter case, there are certainly logs involved. In fact, there are also PoS-specific application logs, such as this example below, coming from an IBM SurePoS device:

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    01/11 09:11 CC     5 W518 PROGRAM ADDDDDXUXDL HAS ENDED                           
                       B3/S111/E007 REASON=2 TYPE=3 RC=00000000            
    SOURCE: OCF                                                                     
    REASON: Application ended            PROGRAM TYPE: Background               
    RC: No error      
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PoS devices might be configured to store credit card numbers locally (for backup) and also to offload them to a "branch server" (a store server or both a store server and a regional server). Are there logs of who accessed them on the local PoS system? Unlikely. Are they looked at? Probably not.  Maybe the logging is done better on the branch or store central server, but even this is not a certainty.

    Overall, I am willing to bet a bottle of decent champagne that very few people, if anybody, in the whole world are regularly looking at PoS logs. At some happy point in the future, I predict they will start since the Beast of PCI will make them :-) When this happens, we will talk about PoS log analysis.

    As of today, you would do comparatively well if you will collect and save them and thus will have a chance to review them for incident response for your next data theft case (or show them to an unusually nosey PCI auditor...)

    More fun PoS security reading is here [PDF].

    Technorati tags: , ,

     


    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on October 05, 2007 in Compliance , Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Just What is Enterprise Class? Part III

    Here is the next enlightening post from Dimitri McKay, our brilliant network and systems engineer from the East Coast, where he continues to discuss the meaning of the phrase "enterprise-class," which is certainly MUCH more than a marketing buzzword! Part I is here, go read it first. Part II is here, go read it next.

    "This is the third piece in the five part series titled “Enterprise Class”. Here we’ve gone through what IS enterprise class and how that corresponds to the LogLogic solution. Feel free to post your comments.

     7.Performance: Performance is a broad topic. We’re not just talking local log collection performance, but also the ability to perform efficiently while in a distributed environment is critical to enterprise class hardware and software.

    While the ability to add more LogLogic appliances allows more devices to be logged and application data to be collected, if the software does not perform with a high level of efficiency, the cost to deploy a system for the required number of devices will be prohibitive.

    LogLogic’s top end reporting appliances handle 4000 messages per second sustained. That is a HUGE amount of traffic. if you’ve ever had to sift through it, you’d agree. Think about it. That’s 240,000 messages per minute. 14.4 million messages per hour. That’s 345.6 million messages per day. Grep that with your syslog server. Parse that with your SIEM. It’s not going to happen (not without an ENORMOUS price tag). And our log collection appliance do even more, way more: 75,000 messages  per second sustained. Wow!

    Performance on a LogLogic appliance is measured based on several factors: CPU usage, messages per second, and disk usage which are important not only for the main functions of the system such as receiving and parsing logs, but also for the ability to run reports and searches on those messages.

    8.Security: Because LogLogic is used for mission critical functions, security is essential. LogLogic must ensure that users who are authenticated to the appliances only have access to the functions they need and access to the log sources that are determined by their job role. LogLogic must also offer the ability to encrypt data as it moves between appliances (which we do via LogLogic TCP) and to also offer the ability to use WORM or data at rest encryption (which is handled by the EMC Centera or NetApp for WORM and Decru for data" at-rest" encryption).

    LogLogic also covers security with the ability to verify that the system is secure through audit trails, general protection of the appliance through a secure linux kernel locked down in the default install, perform self logging, and then hashing the raw logs which are kept in an immutable format. At LogLogic we take security serious, and the box is put through a variety of vulnerability assessments on a regular basis.

    9.Documentation: Because LogLogic handles device support through a specialized group of folks we call “LogLabs” we are able to add devices at an expeditious rate. With each of those new devices comes the required measures to configure each of those devices for logging, and with that knowledge transfer that to documentation. Over time our Documentation Group has continued to grow. Knowledge management is essential to managing the enterprise class solution while alleviating the strain on any of the support or field engineering staff.

    Check back soon, to see more about how LogLogic does Enterprise right. In the next episode I will run off on a tangent about usability and flexibility/interoperability/customizability and support! We are boldly going where no other LMI vendor has gone before!"

    Technorati tags: ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on October 04, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Log Trustworthiness Hierarchy

    This post is inspired by the old TaoSecurity post Enterprise Trust Pyramid where he explains that he trusts some security, system and network evidence data more than other. For example, dedicated NSM sensor records are trusted more than vanilla server logs. With this post, I am looking to establish a log trustworthiness hierarchy so that people start thinking about trusting log data as a kind of a spectrum, from "probably trash" to "guaranteed to be an accurate record of activities."

    So, do you trust your logs to accurately depict what happened on the system or network? Which logs do you trust the most? How do we increase this trust?

    My first draft of such trust hierarchy follows below (from low trust to high trust):

    1. Compromised system logs (mostly trash, but might contain bits that attacker missed/ignored)
    2. Desktop / laptop OS and application logs (possibly changed by users, legitimate systems owners, etc)
    3. All logs from others systems where 'root'/Administrator access is not controlled (e.g. test servers, etc)
    4. Unix application logs  (file-based)
    5. Local Windows application logs
    6. Local Unix OS syslogs
    7. Unix kernel audit logs, process accounting records
    8. Local Windows server OS (a little harder to change)
    9. Database logs (more trusted since DBA cannot touch them, while 'root' can)
    10. Other security appliance logs (located on security appliances)
    11. Various systems logs centralized to a syslog server
    12. Network device and firewall logs (centralized to syslog server)
    13. Logs centralized to a log management system via a real-time feed (obviously, transport encryption adds even more trust)

    Admittedly, the differences between some of them are minor or even non-existent ...

    To conclude, some logs DO in fact provide reliable evidence in case of an incident; you just need to know which ones to trust and which ones to only consider to be "hints" (or possibly even a misdirection). But of course, you need to first have logs and then look at them.

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on September 27, 2007 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters , Security | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Just What is Enterprise Class? Part II

    Here is the next enlightening post from Dimitri McKay, our network and systems engineer from the East Coast, where he continues to discuss the meaning of the phrase "enterprise-class," which is certainly MUCH more than a marketing buzzword! Part I is here, go read it first.

    "4.Scalability: To support a large number of devices in growing enterprises, SIEM and log management products differ a great deal in how they scale. Some of the SIEM products require you to add as many as three new appliances, (which all carry a hefty price tag) just for a slight increase in throughput. Others require you to forklift out your existing hardware to bring in new, bigger (and more expensive) equipment. In my own humble opinion these options are completely ridiculous.

    The LogLogic scalability approach is uniquely simple. “Add log-traffic to your LogLogic appliances until you reach capacity on that box. Then add another box. Rinse and repeat. Each box does it’s own collection, does its own parsing, reporting and searching, and does its own storage. No special other boxes required. All encompassing solution.

    Of course, with “Scalability” comes other requirements of how to add capacity not only vertically, but what of horizontal scalability? Such features would include the ability to report across all LogLogic appliances, manage users and their access rights across a global environment, and use some form of remote authentication such as TACACS+ or RADIUS. This distribution should be an asset, and not a limitation of the overall system scalability. All of these are addressed and in the current LogLogic 4.x.

    5.High Availability: Due to the number of corporations and government agencies depending on LogLogic for regulatory compliance, system security and forensics, as well as heartbeat monitoring and troubleshooting, it’s safe to say that LogLogic is “Mission Critical”.

    Because LogLogic is a “Mission Critical” system, it must support the internal and external capacity for zero downtime via high availability. This is accomplished via bonded NIC’s, hot-swap drives in various RAID arrays and Mirrored sets, hot swap redundant power supplies and most importantly... the ability to link the boxes together in an active pair. Should there be a failure in a LogLogic pair, both appliances are exact clones of each other, and the passive appliance jumps right into gear as the primary. In milliseconds. It’s genius.

    In a perfect world, there would be zero downtime on “Mission Critical” systems. Here at LogLogic, we try to minimize that to as little as possible through the use of various forms of HA, and it shows. Have you seen our new hardware?

    6.Reliability: Although high availability plays a part here, I prefer to think of reliability as the quality of the code-base, the product design itself, and the forward motion of feature sets and additional device support in a timely fashion.

    LogLogic is built on a stripped down lean, mean hardened Linux platform. From there we didn’t go the route of a proprietary datastore which can start as a good idea and then turn into a huge hulking mess with nothing but frustrations stemming from using, maintaining and increasing the capabilities of, but rather we went with a solid database solution for storing meta-data. Industry standard. Well known. Easy to use. Robust.

    Then we built in some brilliant parsers and a very straight forward GUI. Sprinkle that with some great features and a little bit of magic and you have a LogLogic appliance. Our upgrade plans and implementation are fast and furious. We release new device support monthly. Monthly additions. Monthly updates.

    At the end of the day, however, extenuating circumstances happen. Should there be a hardware or software problem, LogLogic support is there to help. With 24/7 support and advanced replacement available to our platinum level enterprise class customers, all the bases are covered.

    Build the appliance on a solid kernel, with a well known and well tuned database. Add HA, some of the finest engineering talent in the world, and a great support team, and LogLogic does enterprise right.

    Stay tuned for the 3rd installment of “Enterprise Class”. LogLogic is going where no LMI vendor has gone before."

    Technorati tags:

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on September 27, 2007 in Innovation , Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    More Web Proxy Log Tips

    After publishing my proxy log tip (here), I figured I'd post a few more mini-tips on web proxy logging as well as a link to my full presentation (webcast with voice, slides only) on web proxy log management.

    First, why look at proxy logs? Apart from my overall answer that applies to all logs, proxy-specific reasons are the following:

    1. Review users’ activities on the web (not just surfing!)
    2. Monitor applications' HTTP activity
    3. Detect Web-enabled malware traffic
    4. Study proxy performance metrics

    Most people just focus on #1 above and kind of forget #2-#4. Also, the focus of #1 is often narrow - what do they surf at work?- and not broad - what do they do on the web? - which is much more useful. While there is no direct mention of proxy logs in recent regulations, monitoring what users do with YOUR data is clearly part of the compliance mandates (and, obviously, a good idea in general!) Indirect references to proxy logging can be seen in the following:

    So, please treat proxy logs with the respect they deserve!  Here is my full presentation (webcast with voice, slides only), on analyzing and managing web proxy logs.

    Related posts:

    Technorati tags: , ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on September 24, 2007 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters , Security | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Just What is Enterprise Class? Part I

    Here is another enlightening post from Dimitri McKay, our network and systems engineer from the East Coast, where he discusses the meaning of the phrase "enterprise-class" (which is sometimes known to be abused in marketing literature...)

    "The Enterprise is generally a huge task, and this post itself is quite large. Due to the mass of both this post and the average Enterprise roll-out, I will break this down into 5 parts. Here is part 1 in the 5 part series.

    I hear the term “Enterprise Class” as a buzz word to define hardware and software. Sometimes it’s used to describe a feature set, and to some it’s a scalability reference. Here’s what “Enterprise Class” means to me, and how it pertains to LogLogic solutions as a whole.

    1. Multi-user: LogLogic handles the Multi-user process in a two prong attack. First, we offer the basic granular local account system which gives users the rights needed to do the job on only the devices they require. Now, on the enterprise side, we have added the ability to connect to TACACS+, RADIUS and soon LDAP/AD servers in order to alleviate the task of managing users on the LogLogic Appliances. Multi-user is a must for anything that is to be considered “Enterprise Class”. I’m hoping to see some additional authentication methods in the future, however, as for now the TACACS+ and RADIUS option certainly covers the majority of our enterprise customers.

    2. Accessibility: In 1998, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to require Federal agencies to make their electronic and information technology accessible to people with disabilities. Inaccessible technology interferes with an individual's ability to obtain and use information quickly and easily.  Section 508 was enacted to eliminate barriers in information technology, to make available new opportunities for people with disabilities, and to encourage development of technologies that will help achieve these goals. Most of the specifications for software pertain to usability for people with vision impairments. For example, one provision requires alternative keyboard navigation, which is essential for people with vision impairments who cannot rely on pointing devices, such as a mouse. Other provisions address animated displays, color and contrast settings, flash rate, and electronic forms, among others (see more at Section508.gov).   Now, at LogLogic, we try to make our GUI as straight forward and easy as possible. We adhere our GUI to the standards and framework put forth by the web browser itself, which thereby adheres itself to the accessibility options within both that browser and also the Operating System.

    3. Localization: As with any business solution, our world isn’t set in one language or specific dialect. As a whole, LogLogic offers language options not only in English but also in languages relevant to foreign countries that are bound by the same requirements that LogLogic can address such as JCobit and J-Sox, which are the Japanese versions of COBIT and Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) compliance. As we move forward LogLogic continues to add alternative language support such as Korean and Chinese.

    Stay tuned for the next episode of “Enterprise Class” where I will run off on a tangent about HA, reliability and scalability."

    Technorati tags: ,

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on September 24, 2007 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    More Project LASSO Updates

    Dimitri McKay, our network and systems engineer from the East Coast contributes this fun story: "When I first started at Loglogic, the only option for retrieving Windows logs was via an open source product called Snare. Snare was a simple concept. It would basically tail a Windows event viewer and whenever a new event was written, Snare would convert that to syslog, and send it over the wire (UDP or TCP) to its destination. Basic concept, basic execution. 

        Now, all of this was well and good, however, I couldn’t help but feel like an agent was not the greatest of solutions. As a former Windows Engineer, I was sort of put off with the idea of agents as a whole. It seemed like everyone was offering agents, and those agents were never happy on my systems in some form or another. So began Project Lasso

        Over some Thai food, Matt Foley, Andrew Morris and myself had a conversation about an agent-less Windows solution, and later that day I found myself writing a PRD for the “Windows Remote Event Collector” which was code named Project Lasso

        The name stuck, and with our 4.0 release I’m really happy with the ongoing development of the product. The concept is simple... Lasso is installed either as an agent to monitor itself, or on a “Project Lasso Server” where it uses WMI connections to connect to the other hosts it will be pulling logs from. There it pulls the string dll’s to a local repository, and then pulls the windows events themselves. Both the string dll’s and the events are then sent to the receiving syslog or Loglogic appliance where they are parsed and indexed. [Anton: they can also be sent to any other syslog receiver, such as a syslog-ng server]

        In 4.0 we added a few features I’m very excited about. 

    The ability to use custom shares. In version 3.x we needed a Domain Admin account to pull the full Windows events. The Domain Admin account was the only account which had access to:

    In Project Lasso 3 if you set some Active Directory policies, you could eliminate the need for a Domain Admin for the registry and event viewer, but not the C$ admin share. The only other account that had access to that was the Backup Administrator. Now, in Project Lasso 4 we don’t have that issue any longer because we can configure just a standard Lasso User account to have access to the registry, the event viewer, and a local drive via a custom share.

    The ability to change the Hostlist.ini on the fly: In Project Lasso version 3.x when you added hosts to be monitored, you had to restart the Lasso service. Well, this process became somewhat onerous in that every time an Administrator needed to add new servers/clients to be monitored by Project Lasso he had to re-start the service which would take quite a bit of time to check those string .dll’s for changes or additions and then start pushing logs to the destination server. This could sometimes take more than a few minutes depending on the number of hosts. So much for real-time alerting or reporting. None of this is a problem anymore as the Project Lasso service will now grab the new hosts on the next pass.

    Shared DLL Repository: Prior to Project Lasso version 4, when a dll Repository was created on the Lasso Server, it downloaded all .dll’s for all monitored hosts. This means there was a ton of the same .dll’s in the repository as each machine would most likely have the same .dll’s. These folders were about 120MB large in Lasso 3 times the number of hosts you were monitoring. That can be a big storage problem in a short amount of time. In Lasso 4, the dll’s are shared among hosts so it has a much smaller disk space requirement.

    In closing, if you’re interested in routing Windows Events to a syslog or Loglogic appliance, you can do so via Project Lasso either in agent mode or in agent-less / remote collector mode.

    Feel free to check out the always free Lasso 4 on Logforge"

    Indeed, Project Lasso  is in wide use among LogLogic customers as well as in the broader world. Deal with Windows logs? Grab Project Lasso!

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on September 17, 2007 in Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters , Project Lasso | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Read "PCI Compliance" book chapter on logging!

    As you know, the "PCI Compliance" book is out. Syngress/Elsevier publisher released one chapter from the book for free: and it is my chapter on log management and logging in PCI! Enjoy it here! [PDF] The book (and, in fact my logging chapter!) already got some glowing reviews.

    While people still argue whether PCI is simple or overly complex, PCI DSS is certainly motivating a lot of people to take a long hard look at their IT security ... For example, more people are starting to look at database logs as a result of PCI. While some vendors are still lagging behind, you can get your database logs into LogLogic today!

    Posted by Anton Chuvakin on August 24, 2007 in Compliance , Log Management & Intelligence , LogEd , LogMatters , Security | Permalink | TrackBack (0)

    Logging Glossary: Log Preprocessing

    As I mentioned here,  I started publishing the LogLogic Logging Glossary. So, here is the eleventh term (first second third fourth fifth sixth seventh eighth ninth