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Last week,
Information Week reported that a former Social Security Administration employee illegally disclosed personal information stolen from a government computer to aid in an identity theft scheme. This employee was paid to look up identifying information about various people using access levels that were consistent with her employment.
In this case, is it unlikely that alarm bells would have gone off when the information was initially obtained, since the employee wasn't hacking into a system-- she already had approved access to all of the information she needed. However, as the case builds against her, the logs of her system activity could become
crucial pieces of evidence.
There are logs for everything the SSA employee did on that system -- legal or illegal. It is important to remember that the benefits of being able to record, report on, and manage your log data do not stop at attack prevention. In a case, like this one, where the breach can not be prevented, information is exposed, and action must be taken
retroactively, having easily accessible, immutable log data to act as a continuous fingerprint of system activity is crucial to ensuring that the attacker is
held accountable for her actions.
Technorati : Log Management, LogLogic, forensics, logging
Posted April 20, 2007 in Compliance , Log Management & Intelligence , Risk Management , Security | Permalink
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